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Résumé / abstract 
 
This paper investigates empirically the relationships between the corruption climate and the 
demand for good governance by focusing on firms' behaviors in developing countries. The 
concept  of demand for  good  governance is  conceived in  terms  of a  firm's  willingness  to 
comply with regulatory norms measured through the firm's perception of the level of public 
accountability as well as the firm's behavior in terms of corruption practices. While there is a 
growing  theoretical  literature  on  the  importance  of  externality  mechanisms  of  corruption 
phenomena, little empirical evidences has been highlighted. This paper contributes to fill this 
gap by using firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey. We show that when 
corruption is found to be a very important constraint for a firm's business, its willingness to 
comply decreases and the probability of the firm's corrupting officials increases. These results 
support  arguments  according  to  which  the  demand  for  good  governance  is  likely  to  be 
influenced by the perception of the existence of pervasive corruption. Moreover, the results 
are conditioned on countries' institutional features and the type of regulation. Some evidence 
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1 Introduction
How to induce, promote and sustain good governance? Where to ﬁnd the drivers of institutional
change? In most studies on governance, priority is given to the supply side of reforms. However, to
study the sustainability and success of such reforms, attention should be also paid to the demand side,
notably the stakeholders’ willingness to comply with regulatory norms as well as their perception of
the governance quality in their environment, i.e., the accountability of public ofﬁcials (Young, 1979;
Zaelke et al., 2005; Odugbemi and Jacobson, 2008; Ivanyna and Shah, 2010). In this research, we
focus on the perceptions of the demand side’s actors about the accountability of supply side actors
as well as about the corruption climate as a potential constraint for the ﬁrm’s business. To what
extent does the ﬁrm’s perception of the degree of public accountability and the level pervasiveness of
corruption shape its demand for good governance through its behaviour in terms of compliance with
regulatory norms as well as in terms of corrupt practices?
Compliance is a substantial element of good governance. Increased focus on it seems to be im-
portant to enhance the success of efforts to strengthen the rule of law, which, in turn, will improve the
achievement of efforts to implement good governance, and so to allow society to reach sustainable
development (Zaelke et al., 2005).
By adopting the norm-based approach of corruption, we seek to understand and check empiri-
cally the importance of externality mechanisms in the pervasiveness and persistence of corruption in
business. Then, we explore the links between regulation policies and stakeholder compliance with in-
stitutions or regulatory norms in a perspective of reconciliation between the supply and demand sides
of governance. By focusing on the externality phenomenon in compliance behavior and, thereby, on
the climate of corruption, this study faces the issue of when do ﬁrms behave normatively like a pure
Homo Sociologicus or like a pure Homo Economicus.
The concept of the demand for good governance is conceived in terms of a ﬁrm’s willingness
to comply with regulatory norms measured through the ﬁrm’s perception of the level of public ac-
countability as well as the ﬁrm’s behavior in terms of corrupt practices. This paper is then related to
two strands of the literature on the demand for good governance. First, in the corruption literature,
the persistence and spread of corruption is explained through the norm-based approach according to
which the corrupt behavior of one ﬁrm generates externalities by making corruption more attractive
for other ﬁrms (Mishra, 2006; Damania et al., 2004; Pierre-Guillaume and Weill, 2010; Leff, 1964;
Huntington, 1968). Thus, the incidence and persistence of corruption is likely to increase with the
number of corrupt ﬁrms in the economy. Corrupt acts are deviations from implicit or explicit be-
havioral norms (with or without legal and ethical connotations). However, the widespread nature of
corruption in some societies tends to reinforce the idea that corrupt behavior could be the norm itself
despite its harmful effects and condemnation. Explaining the widespread corrupt practices, people
usually makes the straightforward argument that “if everyone fails to comply, why should I comply?”
Then, the second branch of the paper is also related to the literature on regulatory compliance
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focused on how a ﬁrm’s characteristics inﬂuence the willingness to comply with existing regulations,
and on the effects of pervasive corruption on ﬁrms’ compliance behavior (Magat and Viscusi, 1990;
Deily and Gray, 1991; Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Murphy and Stranlund, 2007). Compliance with
regulations can be treated in different ways: compliance versus noncompliance, compliance level or
duration of noncompliance episodes. Regulations, enforced fairly, enable businesses to compete on
equal terms. The role of regulated ﬁrms’ “commitment” is most evident when considering ﬁrms’ per-
ceptions of the legitimacy of the regulatory authorities, i.e., public accountability, which is inﬂuenced
by the ﬁrms’ views of how fairly the regulations are created, implemented, and enforced, i.e., the
supply of good governance. Then, the role of spillover effects of the regulator’s reputation has to be
taken into account (Shimshack and Ward, 2005). If governments and regulators expect companies to
respect the law and accept good regulatory standards they also need to recognize that regulators are
accountable to the public and to customers. Sometimes, public institutions may be able to effectively
encourage voluntary compliance to a norm by making compliance less costly.
While there is a growing theoretical literature on the importance of externality mechanisms of
corruption phenomenon, to the best of our knowledge there are no empirical studies on the effects
of ﬁrms’ perception of the extent of endemic corruption on a ﬁrm’s demand for good governance
in terms of willingness to comply and corrupt behaviors. Understanding why some ﬁrms violate
regulatory standards while others overcomply is central to the design of more efﬁcient regulatory
policies.
Then, this paper contributes to ﬁll this gap by using ﬁrm-level data for 73 developing countries
from the World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted in 2002–2006. First, we show that when corrup-
tion is perceived to be a very important constraint for a ﬁrm’s business, its willingness to comply
decreases and its probability to be involved in corruption increases. These results support arguments
according to which the demand for good governance is likely to be inﬂuenced by the perception of
pervasive corruption. The ﬁrst result is typically in line with norms-based explanations of corruption
persistence which stress that noncompliance may become an equilibrium strategy for the ﬁrm because
the perception of endemic corruption leads to the depletion of its beliefs in the fairness of the legal
system. The second result could be linked to economic-based explanations of corruption persistence
according to which the opportunity cost of corrupt behavior decreases when corruption is spread out.
Second, our results also suggest that the effects of endemic corruption are conditioned on countries’s
institutionalfeatures. Third, weuncoverthatpervasivecorruptioninﬂuenceslessﬁrm’senvironmental
petty corruption than other bribe payments, highlighting the ﬁrms’ environmental overcompliance.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short literature review of compliance
and corruption. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 gives the main
summary results and Section 5 presents the econometric results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Literature on compliance and corruption: the challenges
for building good governance
The subject of compliance has been analyzed in many social sciences such as law, sociology, psy-
chology, and political sciences. Economists trying to deal with this issue use mainly the framework of
game theory by analyzing it in terms of the theory of choice and decision. It also constitutes a central
concern in all discussions of “enforcement” in game theory. For Young (1979), compliance refers to
actors’ behaviors which conform with compliance systems.
The wide literature on compliance examines it in different aspects among which are the externality
mechanisms associated to compliance phenomenon including the strategic interactions among ﬁrms
during their compliance decision processes. Thus, some studies try to understand the extent to which
some actors generate and use expectations concerning the likely behavior of others while making their
own decisions.
Other research focuses on the political economy approaches of compliance by linking the behav-
iors of public authorities to those of individual entities such as ﬁrms. Thus, corruption phenomena
arises in the analysis of ﬁrms’ compliance with regulatory norms. Whatever their behavioral attributes
or institutional characteristics, public authorities will always face opportunity costs with respect to the
investment of resources in compliance mechanisms, since the total pool of available resources is ﬁ-
nite and there are many other demands on it. Then, depending on the objectives and resources at the
disposal of public authorities, various kinds of tools can be used for regulation and norm compliance
promotion. From punishments to rewards depending on the compliance level, one might consider
also the investments in governance infrastructures that enable voluntary compliance by individual ac-
tors or ﬁrms. In poor countries where the budgetary resources of public authorities are particularly
scarce, the supervision option is likely to be inefﬁcient while investing in strategies promoting self
compliance should be appropriate.
For ﬁrms, the decision to comply or not depends on many factors among which are the evaluation
of the beneﬁts and costs of compliance and noncompliance. It is worth noting that one might make
some distinction between theoretical compliance and practical compliance, otherwise between a priori
and a posteriori compliance. Indeed, even those who acknowledge the authoritativeness and generally
favor the existence of speciﬁc behavioral or norm prescriptions frequently ﬁnd it advantageous to
violate them in practice (Young, 1979).
Anotheraspectintheregulatoryliteratureconcernsexternalitiesincompliancemechanisms. There-
fore, institutions created to deal with compliance problems could supply positively valued collective
goods such as a general atmosphere of trust. Following the arguments of some behavioral economists
(Kahneman et al., 1986; Rabin, 1994; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; L´ opez-P´ erez, 2009), increasing peo-
ple’s distaste for being immoral can increase the level of immoral activities because of cognitive
dissonance according to which people will feel pressure to convince themselves that immoral activ-
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ities are in fact moral. Thereby, compliance follows a law of demand and people respect norms in a
reciprocal manner, as they are more likely to comply if others are expected to comply too.
In the same vein, social norms can be a major determinant of the extent of corruption in society.
Where norms of law-abidingness are strong, corruption is likely on balance to be lower than where
norms of law-abidingness are weak. Social norms that condone corruption, in turn, undermine the rule
of law by promoting disrespect for the law, and weakening law enforcement and other compliance ef-
forts. Social values and norms that complement and support the rule of law have to be considered
as part of any effort to promote good governance and rule of law (Zaelke et al., 2005). Indeed cor-
ruption is commonly deﬁned as “behavior that deviates from formal duties because of private gains.”
Nonetheless the widespread nature of corruption in some societies indicates that corrupt behavior
could be conceived as the norm itself despite the fact that it is inefﬁcient and generally condemned
(Mishra, 2006).
Some authors argues that corruption at the ﬁrm level can be explained by indirect factors, such
as culture or the level of rents that can be appropriated (Brunetti and Weder, 2003). For instance,
the characteristics of ﬁrms that will be extorted by ofﬁcials depend on the opportunities for extor-
tion and the likelihood of punishment. Being victimized by government ofﬁcials might affect the
ﬁrm’s compliance with government rules (Ayyagari et al., 2010). Moreover, large ﬁrms came out as
more exposed to corruption, and also better able to inﬂuence contract procedures through unethical
means (Eerola, 2004). Indeed, the presence of business corruption provokes ﬁrms to make choices
between legal business approaches and illegal bribery. Firms with similar ethical codes and compli-
ance systems can respond to corruption-related challenges in very different ways. For Søreide (2009)
a ﬁrm’s decision will depend partly on its attitude towards risk. Thus, risk averse ﬁrms can be more
inclined to offer bribes than risk neutral and risk attracted ﬁrms. Moreover, for a ﬁrm, the propensity
to be involved in corruption will depend on various characteristics such as its local or foreign own-
ership, location of headquarters, ownership structure, role in lobbying efforts, sector characteristics,
perceived and actual capacity of government, regulatory institutions’ capacity and independence, and
the perceived extent of corruption in the sector.
Perceptions of the prevalence of corruption drive a low conﬁdence in institutions, but just as plau-
sibly the opposite could be true: individuals who lack conﬁdence in public institutions might as a
result express the view that corruption is widespread (Clausen et al., 2009). In the same perspective
various ways to approach the issue of the persistence and pervasiveness of corruption are found in the
literature (Bardhan, 1997). While existing models of corruption tend to focus primarily on the costs
and beneﬁts of noncompliance, Mishra (2006) proposes to look at the costs and beneﬁts of compli-
ance as in many of the corrupt societies, those who comply with the law or social standards often
become victims of harassment, extortion, and alleged corrupt behavior. He examines how pervasive
corruption can be persistent despite the presence of anti-corruption measures and incentives. The
argument is that when corruption becomes the social norm, low compliance is likely to become the
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equilibrium strategy. When there are many corrupt individuals in the society, it may become opti-
mal to be corrupt despite the presence of anti-corruption policies and incentives. Different societies
with the same levels of development, judicial machinery, and politico-legal structures could exhibit
varying degrees of corruption, tax evasion, and other regulatory noncompliance. This arises because
different societies could get caught in different equilibria due to various forms of externalities rooted
in people’s perceptions and beliefs. If people expect more people to be corrupt, the expected cost of
being corrupt would be less (the probability of apprehension might be low or even the social sanction
against corruption could be weakened), leading to more people being corrupt.
In this paper, we support the fact that these arguments could apply to ﬁrms’ behaviors in terms
of corruption and compliance. Basically, in a pervasive corruption climate, many ﬁrms are likely to
consider that they have to bribe or noncomply if they would like to survive in their group of reference.
Theempiricalsectionaimsatcheckingtheexistenceoftheseexternalitymechanismsinthecorruption
and compliance phenomenon.
Besides, sometimes there may be discrepancies between beliefs about corruption frequency and
its actual incidence. To curb administrative corruption, the government may undertake institutional
reforms to improve the efﬁciency of the judiciary and the level of regulatory compliance. However, it
is assumed that such reforms are a gradual process and necessitate investment in legal and administra-
tive infrastructure. Yet, political instability is shown to create an environment under which corruption
becomes more pervasive and tends to persist (Damania et al., 2004). With greater political uncer-
tainty, the regulatory norms and policy are more likely to be altered by a future government who may
also be constrained in its ability to enforce compliance with its chosen policy because of inheriting
a weak judiciary system. Thus, this instability makes the government more receptive to lobbying.
Therefore, the level of bureaucratic regulation and judicial efﬁciency in a country could be the main
roots from which corruption becomes more endemic. For instance, regulation is associated with many
adverse impacts on markets such as corruption (Djankov et al., 2002; Amin and Ranjan, 2008). This
way, literature focusing on inherited legal systems and investigating the trade-off between civil law
and common law systems could be seen as an important factor shaping corrupt climate effects. In
fact, the Legal Origins Theory of development developed by La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, Vishny and
Shleifer (LLSV–several papers La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2007)) tries to explain the differences in
economic and social performance using the legal origins of law and regulation. According to these au-
thors, legal origins are deﬁned by “the style of social control on economic life” (La Porta et al., 2007)
and the style of a legal system is inﬂuenced by political institutions (legal procedures,...), ideology,
broader attitudes and philosophy which depend on the historical background and so on the historical
institutional framework represented by the legal origins. Then, La Porta et al. (1999) and Treisman
(2000) show that common law countries have less corrupt societies, less regulated economies, and a
high judicial efﬁciency. In turn, common law economies could be less characterized by corruption
climates so that the demand for good governance provided by ﬁrms should be less inﬂuenced by the
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pervasiveness of corruption, unlike the situation in civil law countries.
In addition, while looking at the speciﬁc case of corruption related to a ﬁrm’s environmental
compliance, different lines have been studied in the literature. Some studies have shown that large
plants may be under greater enforcement pressure than smaller plants and even they are more efﬁcient
in controlling pollution or if there exist economies of scale with respect to pollution control, large
ﬁrms could be less likely to be out of compliance (Magat and Viscusi, 1990; Deily and Gray, 1991).
Dasgupta (2000) and Gangadharan (2006) show that the probability of complying depends on,
among other factors, the kind of management practices of the ﬁrm and the level of environmental
training. In some cases, there are trade agreements that could prevent or make it very difﬁcult for
polluting ﬁrms to sell their products internationally.
Some results have also been found about the overcompliance of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector.
In fact, there is growing evidence that many ﬁrms comply with environmental regulations even when
these regulations are weak or non-existent, a fact well known as the Harrington paradox (Harrington,
1988). Some ﬁrms have incentives to comply in order to avoid being moved into the frequently in-
spected group. Other explanations of overcompliance use the arguments of business strategy seeking
to gain reputation as an environmentally conscious organization or aiming to guide regulatory author-
ities to set higher standards for the whole industry, thereby increasing the costs of their rivals (Heyes,
2005; Decker and Pope, 2005; Mohr, 2006; Denicolo, 2008; Wu, 2009). As shown in Shimshack and
Ward (2005), the reputations of government and regulators for making credible enforcement policies
signiﬁcantly increases ﬁrms’ statutory overcompliance with regulations as well.
3 Data and empirical methodology
3.1 Data and variables
3.1.1 Presentation of the Enterprise Survey
Our data come from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (ES)1 that uses standardized survey instru-
ments to study ﬁrm behavior as well as performance, and to analyze the investment climate of enter-
prises across the world. ES collects information “about the business environment, how it is perceived
by individual ﬁrms, how it changes over time, and about the various constraints to ﬁrm performance
and growth.”
Thepurposeofthissurveyistoadvisegovernments(localandnational)onwaystochangepolicies
that hinder private establishments and to develop new policies and programs that support productivity
growth.
We use data for several countries which have been matched to a standard set of questions. More
precisely, the survey sample covers registered businesses in each country, uses standardized survey
1Data have been downloaded on this website http://www.enterprisesurveys.org.
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instruments and follows a stratiﬁed random sampling methodology. Furthermore, ES implies that data
consists of pooled cross-sections (here ﬁrms) over time hence there is no replicability2.
All the surveys in our sample represents 71,789 ﬁrms surveyed during 2002–2006. For the pur-
pose of our study, only enterprises located in low and low-middle income countries are used and we
exclude all ﬁrms in the service sector. Finally, our dataset represents 33,076 ﬁrms in 73 countries with
main activities in manufacturing, agro-industry and construction (see Table 8, page 27 for the list of
countries)3.
In this study we analyze relationships between the corruption climate and the demand for good
governance conceived through a ﬁrm’s willingness to comply with norms and a ﬁrm’s bribe payments
to public ofﬁcials. The ES surveys make this analysis suitable for investigating the relation between
thedemandforgoodgovernanceandtheexistenceofpervasivecorruption. Infact, thesurveyscontain
information on illegal activities such petty corruption (bribe payments by ﬁrms to public ofﬁcials) and
the ﬁrm’s perception of the impact of endemic corruption on its business.
Information on the corruption climate helps us to study the persistence of noncompliance and
so corrupt activities (the higher is endemic corruption, the lower could be the ﬁrm’s willingness to
comply and the higher would be the ﬁrm’s willingness to corrupt in order to maintain its activities).
In the following part, we present our two measures of a ﬁrm’s demand for good governance, i.e., a
ﬁrm’s willingness to comply and a ﬁrm’s petty corruption, measuring the practical demand for good
governance, as well as the corruption climate.
3.1.2 Main interested variables
In this paper, we try to understand how endemic corruption could affect a ﬁrm’s demand for good
governance. However, the concept of demand for good governance is not straightforward to analyze.
The degree of public ofﬁcials’ accountability represents more directly the concept of demand for good
governance. In fact, the higher is the accountability, and the higher are the citizens’ interests in good
governance practices, the higher will be their demand for good governance to suppliers, i.e., public
ofﬁcials. However, in this paper, we assume that the concept of good governance could be extended in
two ways. First, a ﬁrm’s willingness to comply with regulatory norms deduced from their perception
of public’s ofﬁcials accountability could represent a part of the ﬁrm’s demand for good governance.
In turn, this willingness can be viewed as a signal sent to public ofﬁcial by ﬁrms to demand more
good governance. Second, we take into account the ﬁrm’s behavior concerning corrupt activities. The
higher will be these practices, the lower should be the ﬁrm’s demand for good governance reforms.
In the following part, we describe how we have constructed these two variables (see Table 10,
page 29 for descriptive statistics of all variable across countries and ﬁrms).
2More precisely, some of the countries are surveyed in multiple years but during each year a new random sample is
taken from the relevant population.
3The number of countries varies depending on the dependent variable used and the sample used.
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Willingness to comply Unfortunately, there is no direct information on the willingness to comply
with regulatory norms in the ES. Hence, a variable of compliance has to be created from information
provided by the ES. Given that compliance could be deﬁned as the degree of appropriation of the
legal system, we use two questions on the perception by the ﬁrm of the level of accountability of
public ofﬁcials. Put differently, a ﬁrm’s perception of the degree of public ofﬁcials’ accountability
determines the degree of demand for good governance of the ﬁrm which in turn affects its willingness
to comply. More precisely, the two questions are (i) the consistency and predictability of government
ofﬁcials’ interpretation of regulations and (ii) the efﬁciency of the legal system to resolve disputes.
More precisely, the questions used are:
 In general, government ofﬁcials’ interpretations of regulations affecting my establishment are
consistent and predictable. To what extent do you agree with this statement? 1. Fully disagree
to 6. Fully agree.
 I am conﬁdent that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and property rights in busi-
ness disputes. To what degree do you agree with this statement? 1. Fully disagree to 6. Fully
agree.
The variable of compliance is a dummy created as follows: 0 if the ﬁrm responds between 1 and 3
in both previous questions and 1 if the response is at least 4 in one of the two questions. For instance,
since a ﬁrm responds that it has a high level of conﬁdence in the consistency of government ofﬁcials’
interpretations of regulations, it will be considered a priori as compliant even if it has a low level of
conﬁdence in the judicial system (Responses 1 to 3 in the second question).
Petty corruption (Bribe) An issue studied in this paper concerns the role of corruption climate
on petty corruption (bribes paid by ﬁrms to public ofﬁcials). As a measure of bribe payments we
construct a variable, Bribes, which are a ﬁrm’s response to the question: “ During inspections and
mandatory meetings with ofﬁcials of agencies in the context of regulation of your business, was gift
or informal payment ever expected/requested? 1=NO; 2=YES”4.
While this is a general variable proxying for the extent of petty corruption of a ﬁrm, we use
also the response concerning each regulation, i.e., bribes paid to ﬁscal, labor, safety, sanitation and
environmental government agencies. This information allows us to highlight the special case of ﬁrm’s
environmental bribe payments.
Corruption climate: To measure the explanatory variable of interest, i.e., the corruption climate,
we build a categorical variable which are responses to the question: Please tell us if corruption was a
4In the survey, the question concerns the following agencies: Tax Inspectorate, Labor and Social Security, Fire and
Building Safety, Sanitation/Epidemiology, Municipal Police and Environmental. We create a dummy with 1 if the ﬁrm
reports to have bribed an agent at least once regardless of the type of agency.
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problem for the operation and growth of your business. If it poses a problem, please judge its severity
as an obstacle on a four-point scale where: 0 = No obstacle; 1 = Minor obstacle; 2 = Moderate
obstacle; 3 = Major obstacle; 4 = Very Severe Obstacle.. This categorical variable allows us to assess
a nonlinear effect of corruption pervasiveness on a ﬁrm’s demand for good governance.
3.2 Empirical methodology
In this section we investigate empirical issues of this paper: could corruption climate inﬂuence (i) a
ﬁrm’s willingness to comply; (ii) a ﬁrm’s practical compliance, i.e., petty corruption ?
Moreover, since our dependent variables (Compliance, Bribe) are qualitative binary response
variables, we use a logit speciﬁcation with country, industry and year ﬁxed effects. For each of the
following regressions, observations are clustered by countries to avoid spatial correlations.
3.2.1 Basic equation
First, we examine whether the corruption climate affecting the business environment of ﬁrms could
inﬂuence their willingness to comply and their corrupt activities. In order to highlight the potential
nonlinearity of endemic corruption, we use all dimensions of the variable of pervasive corruption
(corruption climate) divided into ﬁve parts: No Obstacle (the reference), Minor Obstacle, Moderate
Obstacle, Major Obstacle, Very Severe Obstacle.
Also, the question of the endogeneity of corruption climate could occur. In fact, the level of
compliance or corruption of the ﬁrm could inﬂuence the level of corruption in an economy only if this
enterprise is a dominant actor. To deal with this issue, we introduce a control variable concerning the
share of national market held by each ﬁrm. Hence, for ﬁrm i in industry j and in country k, we run
the following regression:
Compliancei;j;k=Bribei;j;k = 0 + 1MinorCorrupti;j;k + 2ModerateCorrupti;j;k
+ 3MajorCorrupti;j;k + 4SevereCorrupti;j;k + kX
k
i;j;k
+ 5Ij + 6Ck + 7Y earsDummies + "i;j;k
(1)
where Ij and Ck are, respectively, industry and country ﬁxed effects, with j = 1;:::;4 and
k = 1;:::545. Compliance is the ﬁrm’s willingness to comply and Bribe represents the ﬁrm’s petty
corruption or its practical compliance. X are the following ﬁrm’s features: part of the national market
held by the ﬁrm, membership of a business association, ﬁrm’s size, exporter status, ownership status,
education of the manager, legal status, year of beginning of business and capacity utilization over the
5The four industry sectors are Textile, Forestry, Agro-industry and Other Manufacturing ﬁrms. The number of coun-
tries changes according the regressions (43 countries with all controls ﬁrm’s features).
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last year6.
3.2.2 Conditional effect and heterogeneities
Effects of the corruption climate on a ﬁrm’s demand for good governance, i.e., its level of compliance
with regulations, could be conditioned by (i) the country’s institutional features and (iii) the ﬁeld of
regulation.
Country’s institutional framework As we have shown earlier, an issue in the literature is the role
of the institutional framework in a country on corrupt activities and the willingness to comply. To
deal with this issue, Equation 1 is run under each of the following sub-samples: i) unstable and
stable regimes; ii) low and high government effectiveness; iii) low and high judicial efﬁciency and iv)
common law and civil law countries.
For the variable of regime stability, we use an index of Political Stability which measures “percep-
tions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly
unconstitutional and/or violent means” averaged over 2000–2006 and provided by the Worldwide
Government Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank (all scores lie between  2:5 and 2:5, with higher
scores corresponding to better outcomes.). The Government Effectiveness index from WGI capturing
“perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” is used (from -2.5 (low) to 2.5 (high),
averaged over 2000–2006). For judicial efﬁciency, the Rule of Law index from WGI “capturing
perceptions of the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of society, and
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well
as the likelihood of crime and violence” is introduced (from -2.5 (low) to 2.5 (high), averaged over
2000–2006). We also use data on Legal Origins divided between English common law and French
civil law and provided by (La Porta et al., 2007).
Environmental issue The role of the corruption climate on a ﬁrm’s demand for good governance
takes a particular importance in the environmental ﬁeld. More precisely, while looking at the speciﬁc
case of corruption related to a ﬁrm’s environmental compliance, we try to analyse evidences which
are found about the environmental overcompliance of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector.
In order to analyze this issue, we estimate the effects of the corruption climate on bribe payments
in different regulations by regressing Equation 1 on bribe payments in the ﬁve following regulations:
environmental, ﬁscal, labor, ﬁre/building safety and sanitary.
6Capacity utilization is deﬁned as “the amount of output actually produced relative to the maximum amount that could
be produced with (the) existing machinery and equipment and regular shifts” in the survey.
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4 Main descriptive statistics
4.1 Summary statistics
We begin with a short presentation of the summary statistics of the main variables. Table 1 reports
information on the ﬁrm’s features (geographic location, ownership status, legal status, exporter status
and ﬁrm’s size) by industry (textiles and garments, agro-industry and food, wood and paper and other
manufacturing ﬁrms (mainly metal and machinery, chemicals and pharmaceutics, electronics, non-
metallic and plastic materials and construction)).
Table 1: Firm’s Features across Industries
Industry
Textile Agroindust. Wood Other Total ] of
and Garments and Food and Paper ﬁrms
% % % % %
Panel A: Geographic Location
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.4 18.4 37.9 11.2 13.9 5 171
East Asia and Paciﬁc 25.8 18.2 19.1 31.2 26.2 9 751
Europe and Central Asia 8.2 20.4 14.4 16.6 14.9 5 527
Latin America and the Caribbean 26.2 26.1 23.4 21.8 24.0 8 913
Middle East and North Africa 13.2 7.7 5.2 9.5 9.8 3 647
South Asia 19.2 9.2 0.0 9.6 11.3 4 190
Panel B: Ownership
Foreign 11.9 12.1 8.4 13.8 12.5 4 589
Domestic 88.1 87.9 91.6 86.2 87.5 32 196
Panel C: Legal Status
Publicly listed company 6.9 9.8 7.2 8.4 8.1 2 060
Privately held, limited company 43.7 37.1 41.9 42.5 41.8 10 572
Cooperative 4.6 3.0 2.3 5.1 4.3 1 088
Sole proprietorship 20.4 26.0 27.0 14.4 19.4 4 911
Partnership 12.2 12.4 10.6 11.4 11.7 2 971
Other 12.1 11.7 11.0 18.2 14.6 3 692
Panel D: Exporter Status
Exporter 34.4 19.1 18.3 19.4 23.3 8 464
Non-exporter 65.6 80.9 81.7 80.6 76.7 27 858
Panel E: Firm Sizes
Small(<20) 29.4 37.0 49.1 33.4 34.4 11 381
Medium(20-99) 35.9 36.7 35.9 38.1 37.0 12 243
Large(100 and over) 34.7 26.2 15.0 28.6 28.6 9 452
Total 8 995 6 542 2 945 14 594 33 076
Authors’ Calculations
Panel A presents statistics across different regions. In the sample, 26 percent of ﬁrms are located
in East Asia and Paciﬁc, 24 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, 15 percent in Europe and
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Central Asia, 14 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 10 percent in the Middle East and North Africa.
Moreover, signiﬁcant heterogeneities by industry can be noticed. For instance, 38 percent of the ﬁrms
in forestry are located in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Panel B presents information on the ﬁrm’s ownership status. Col. 6 of Panel B shows that the ﬁrms
are mainly domestic (87.5 percent). Besides, forestry is the more domestic sector (only 8.4 percent of
ﬁrms held by foreigners) whereas agro-industry and textiles are more held by foreigners (respectively
12.1 percent and 11.9 percent). Panel C reports statistics on the ﬁrm’s legal status. Firms are mainly
privately held companies (41.8 percent of all sample) with small heterogeneities between industry.
Panel D gives information on exporter status. More than one third of ﬁrms in the industry of textile
are exporter (34.2 percent in col. 2). In forestry, ﬁrms are mainly oriented toward the domestic market
(only 18.3 of ﬁrms are exporters). Lastly, Panel E provides statistics on ﬁrm size. Col. 6 shows that
the sample is fairly distributed: small ﬁrms (less than 20 employees), medium (between 20 and 99
employees) and big ones (more than 99 employees) represent on average respectively 34.4, 37.0 and
28.6 percent of the sample.
4.2 Firm’s willingness to comply, ﬁrm’s petty corruption, and corruption cli-
mate across countries and ﬁrms
4.2.1 Firm’s compliance and ﬁrm’s petty corruption
Table 2 reports statistics on the average percentage of ﬁrms which are willing to comply with regu-
latory norms and which are bribe-givers across different country institutional classiﬁcations (Panel A
to Panel E) and different ﬁrm categories (Panel F to Panel J).
Across countries: First, col. 2 of Panel A shows that the average willingness to comply is high
across all countries ranging from 61.7 percent (of ﬁrms) in Latin American and Caribbean countries
to 82.6 percent in East Asian countries and 83.4 percent in North Africa. Col. 3 of Panel A reports the
average bribe payments, which range from 8.6 percent (of ﬁrms) in Latin American and Caribbean
countries to 60.4 percent of ﬁrms in East Asian countries.
Second, Panels B to E show the distribution of ﬁrms depending on the level of political stability,
government effectiveness, judicial efﬁciency and legal origins. In Panel B, we focus on Political
Stability indicator, which ranges from -2.55 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) to 0.92 (Cape Verde)
with a median value which varies depending on the sample 7. Hence, countries are classiﬁed into high
and low political stability depending on whether the average index of political stability in each country
is respectively above or below the median value. We ﬁnd that the less unstable countries have a higher
percentage of ﬁrms which are more willing to comply, and a lower percentage of ﬁrms which are bribe
7For instance, concerning compliance, the median value is 0.74 whereas it is 0.56 for petty corruption. The differences
are due to sample size.
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givers, whatever the type of corrupt activities.
Table 2: Compliance and Bribe Across Countries
The variables are described as follows: Compliance is the percentage of ﬁrms which are willing to comply; Bribes
is the percentage of ﬁrm which have bribed, at least one time, an ofﬁcial. Environmental and Fiscal represent
the percentage of ﬁrms which have bribed, respectively, for environmental and ﬁscal purposes.
Firm’s Demand for Good Governance Theoretical Practical: Petty Corruption
Compliance Bribe Environmental Fiscal
Panel A: Geographic Regions
Sub-Saharan Africa 73.1 20.9 4.00 2.07
East Asia and Paciﬁc 82.6 60.4 24.2 4.23
Europe and Central Asia 66.5 60.2 37.9 4.94
Latin America and the Caribbean 61.7 08.6 3.80 7.7
Middle and North Africa 83.4 36.6 22.1 3.16
South Asia 78.1 59.9 71.6 6.12
Panel B: Level of Political Stability
Unstable 75.8 42.4 31.7 38.2
Stable 70.2 39.1 26.3 29.8
Panel C: Government Effectiveness
Low 66.6 42.9 35.2 39.0
High 79.4 39.0 23.3 28.4
Panel D: Rule of Law
Low 69.2 43.0 32.6 35.9
High 80.6 15.7 18.5 30.3
Panel E: Legal Origins
Common Law 79.8 13.8 35.5 38.9
Civil Law 67.3 10.0 7.4 14.5
Authors’ Calculations
Third, in Panel C, we focus on government effectiveness, which ranges from -1.61 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo) to 0.75 (South Africa) with a different median value according to sample.
We ﬁnd that countries with low government effectiveness have a lower percentage of ﬁrms which are
more willing to comply, and a higher percentage of ﬁrms which are bribe givers than countries with
strong government effectiveness (whatever the type of corrupt activities).
Fourth, in Panel D, we focus on judicial efﬁciency measured with the Rule of Law index ranging
from -1.24 (Georgia) to 0.23 (Uganda) with a different median value according to sample. We uncover
that countries with weaken judicial efﬁciency have a lower percentage of ﬁrms which are more willing
to comply, and a higher percentage of ﬁrms which are bribe givers (whatever the type of corrupt
activities) than countries with strong judicial efﬁciency.
Fifth, inPanelE,wepresentstatisticsontheﬁrm’sdemandforgoodgovernancebelongingtolegal
origins on law and regulations. We ﬁnd that common law countries have a higher percentage of ﬁrms
which are more willing to comply than in civil law countries. Differently, civil law countries have a
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lower percentage of petty corruption compared to common law countries. These results suggest that
the legal tradition of law and regulations could inﬂuence differently the demand for good governance.
Across ﬁrms: In Panels A to E of Table 3, we analyze the average of the percentage of ﬁrms which
are compliant and which are bribe givers.
Table 3: Compliance and Bribe Across Firms
The variables are described as follows: Compliance is the percentage of ﬁrms which are willing to comply; Bribes
is the percentage of ﬁrm which have bribed, at least one time, an ofﬁcial. Environmental and Fiscal represent
the percentage of ﬁrms which have bribed, respectively, for environmental and ﬁscal purposes.
Firm’s Demand for Good Governance Theoretical Practical: Petty Corruption
Compliance Bribe Environmental Fiscal
Panel A: Firm sizes
Small(<20) 68.2 36.2 28.8 30.1
Medium(20-99) 70.3 37.7 28.0 31.3
Large(100 and over) 77.0 44.4 31.2 31.9
Total 20 589 19 700 5 601 16 768
Panel B: Ownership
Foreign 73.0 41.3 26.3 27.6
Domestic 72.7 40.7 29.4 35.1
Total 23 040 22 767 9 097 19 321
Panel C: Exporter Status
Exporter 74.7 41.2 27.9 32.8
Non-exporter 72.2 40.5 29.4 34.2
Total 22 697 22 521 9 023 19 131
Panel D: Legal Status
Publicly listed company 73.1 29.8 22.0 25.6
Privately held, limited company 71.1 38.3 25.1 31.6
Cooperative 65.8 74.3 42.0 51.9
Sole proprietors 69.7 49.3 36.3 46.3
Partnership 72.0 55.6 37.6 46.5
Other 76.2 49.8 22.5 31.1
Total 18 819 16 706 9 014 13 721
Panel E: Industry Sector
Textiles and Garments 73.3 42.3 29.4 36.0
Agroindust. and Food 69.8 35.0 28.9 31.9
Wood and Paper 69.4 31.3 19.6 29.1
Other 74.9 44.6 31.2 35.0
Total 23 376 23 014 9 112 19 530
Authors’ Calculations
First, in Panel A, we show that large ﬁrms are more likely to comply (77.1 percent) than other
ﬁrms while they are more likely to be bribe givers (44.4 percent).
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Second, ﬁrm ownership categories (Panel B) seem to not matter for the level of compliance and
petty corruption. However we can notice that domestic enterprises are more inclined to corrupt en-
vironmental and ﬁscal ofﬁcials than foreign ﬁrms. Third, in Panel D, we focus on legal status. We
show that publicly listed companies are less likely to be bribe givers (29.8 percent) and are more will-
ing to comply (73.1 percent) than privately held ﬁrms (38.3 and 71.1 percent for bribe payments and
compliance, respectively).
Last, when we look at industry in panel E, we ﬁnd that forestry ﬁrms are less willing to comply
with regulation (69.4 percent) but ﬁnally these ﬁrms are less likely to be bribe givers (31.3 percent).
We ﬁnd that only 19.6 percent of forestry ﬁrms have corrupted an ofﬁcial in charge of environmental
regulation whereas in agro-industry, textile and other manufacturing ﬁrms 28.9, 29.4 and 31.2 percent,
respectively, of ﬁrms are bribe givers.
4.2.2 Corruption climate across countries and ﬁrms
Table 4 reports the proportion of ﬁrms which consider that the corruption climate is i) not an obstacle,
ii) a minor obstacle, iii) a moderate obstacle, iv) a major obstacle and v) a very severe obstacle for
their businesses.
First, in Panel A (col. 2), we ﬁnd that the majority of ﬁrms considering that the corruption cli-
mate is not an obstacle for their business are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, or Latin America and
Caribbean countries (53.8 and 51.3 percent). However, these ﬁrms represent only 24.1, 34.5, 38.8 per-
cent in South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, and East Asia respectively. Moreover, ﬁrms considering
corruption pervasiveness as a very severe obstacle for their activities are 14.5 percent in Sub-Saharan
Africa, 22.1 percent in Latin America, and 22.5 percent in South Asia (the second largest category
of ﬁrms in these three areas). Basically, ﬁrms thinking that corruption climate is at least a major
constraint are more than 40 percent in South Asia, 36 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, a third in Latin
America, 26 percent in East Asia, and 24 percent in Europe and Central Asia.
Second, in Panels B and C, we focus on how corruption climate depends on the level of political
stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and legal origin of law and regulations. We ﬁnd that
corruption seems to have more severe impacts on a ﬁrm’s business in unstable regimes (Panel B,
col. 6), weak government effectiveness (Panel C, col. 6), and low judicial efﬁciency (Panel D, col.
6). However, there is no linearity: ﬁrms reporting corruption climate as being not an obstacle are
mainly located in these previous countries. Concerning the effects of legal origins, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms
considering corruption pervasiveness as a major constraint are mainly located in civil law countries
(21.7 percent) but alternatively, ﬁrms conceiving corruption climate as being not an impediment are
mainly in civil law countries.
Third, we ﬁnd that corruption is perceived as having a more severe impact in medium size enter-
prises (Panel D, col. 2), domestic ones (Panel E, col. 7), non-exporters (Panel F, col. 9), organized in
cooperative (Panel G, col. 6), and in forestry (Panel H, col. 11).
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Table 4: Corruption Climate Across Countries and Firms
The perception of the Pervasiveness of Corruption for Firm’s Businesses
Across Countries No Obstacle Minor Obstacle Moderate Obstacle Major Obstacle Very Severe Obstacle ] of Countries
Panel A: Geographic Regions
Sub-Saharan Africa 53.8 9.6 9.8 12.2 14.5 26
East Asia and Paciﬁc 38.8 17.6 16.2 14.6 12.8 9
Europe and Central Asia 34.5 21.6 19.2 23.5 1.2 20
Latin America and the Caribbean 51.3 8.1 7.5 11.1 22.1 13
South Asia 24.1 15.1 20.1 18.2 22.5 3
Panel B: Level of Political Stability
Unstable 43.8 11.9 13.8 14.6 15.8 30
Stable 42.4 14.8 13.1 14.4 15.3 47
Panel C: Government Effectiveness
Low 43.2 12.3 12.5 15.1 17.0 47
High 41.9 15.0 14.8 14.1 14.2 27
Panel D: Rule of Law
Low 46.3 12.0 10.5 14.4 16.7 33
High 40.9 14.2 14.9 14.7 15.2 41
Panel E: Legal Origins
Common Law 38.3 13.8 16.3 14.6 17.1 13
Civil Law 44.8 10.0 9.9 13.6 21.7 22
Across Firms No Obstacle Minor Obstacle Moderate Obstacle Major Obstacle Very Severe Obstacle ] of Firms
Panel F: Firm sizes
Small(<20) 49.2 11.4 10.7 13.4 15.4 10 867
Medium(20-99) 42.0 13.4 12.9 14.8 16.9 11 275
Large(100 and over) 37.3 15.9 16.4 15.8 14.5 8 342
Panel G: Ownership Status
Foreign 42.0 16.2 14.3 15.4 12.0 4 175
Domestic 43.2 13.0 13.3 14.4 16.1 29 855
Panel H: Exporter Status
Exporter 40.3 15.3 14.7 14.9 14.9 7 987
Non-exporter 44.0 12.9 13.0 14.4 15.7 25 704
Panel I: Legal Status
Publicly listed company 30.8 13.4 17.3 17.2 21.3 1 843
Private held, limited company 27.3 15.6 17.2 18.7 21.2 9 760
Cooperative 25.8 13.6 12.0 17.8 30.8 766
Sole proprietorship 31.4 14.7 15.9 20.0 17.9 4 663
Partnership 31.1 16.1 19.0 18.7 15.1 2 818
Other 33.4 19.4 17.9 16.9 12.4 2 888
Panel J: Industry Sector
Textiles and Garments 38.5 12.1 14.2 15.7 19.5 9 498
Agroindust. and Food 47.9 13.0 12.8 13.6 12.7 6 697
Wood and Paper 39.0 12.1 12.6 15.6 20.8 3 137
Other 44.6 14.9 13.4 13.9 13.2 15 073
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165 Econometric results
5.1 Does endemic corruption inﬂuence ﬁrm’s willingness to comply?
In this part, we show results concerning the following issue: is a ﬁrm’s willingness to comply inﬂu-
enced by the perception of the impact on the ﬁrm’s business of the degree of the pervasiveness of
corruption? As shown in Section 2, there is a substantial literature on the willingness to comply and
a corruption climate based on norms explanations of corruption persistence. This literature stresses
that noncompliance may become an equilibrium strategy for the ﬁrm because the perception of this
endemic corruption leads to a weakening of its conﬁdence in the fairness of the legal system. More-
over, these relationships could be shaped by other features linked to the legal environment such as
political stability, the degree of government effectiveness, judicial efﬁciency, or legal origins on law
and regulations8.
In the ﬁrst two columns of the Table 5, we present results without these heterogeneous effects.
We ﬁnd that the corruption climate inﬂuences a ﬁrm’s willingness to comply. Controlling for the
ﬁrm’s attributes (col. 2), we show that a ﬁrm conceiving that endemic corruption is not an obstacle
for its business has a probability of about 82 percent to comply with regulatory norms whereas a
ﬁrm considering endemic corruption as being a very severe impediment is less likely to comply with
regulations (67 percent). This result shows the fact that in a more corrupt environment, ﬁrms are less
inclined to comply since their beliefs in the fairness of the legal system are weakened by this endemic
corruption.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that in more unstable regimes, a ﬁrm is more likely to comply than in a stable
regime whatever the perception of the impact of endemic corruption. We also uncover that ﬁrms
considering endemic corruption as a very severe impediment, have a low propensity to comply in a
stable regime (66 percent), unlike the same ﬁrm in a unstable regime (72 percent).
However, our results suggest an important inﬂuence of government effectiveness. In fact, in col.
3 to col. 4, we ﬁnd that a ﬁrm’s willingness to comply is more signiﬁcant in a country with high
government effectiveness whatever the inﬂuence of the pervasiveness of corruption. For instance, a
ﬁrm in a country with low government effectiveness and which considers the corruption climate as
being a very severe impediment has a propensity of about 62 percent to comply whereas the same
sort of ﬁrm (all things being equal) has a propensity to comply of about 73 percent in a country
with high government effectiveness. Moreover, in col. 5 and col. 6, we ﬁnd that judicial efﬁciency
seems to condition corruption climate effects on a ﬁrm’s theoretical demand for good governance. In
fact, despite the severe impact of the corruption climate on their businesses, ﬁrms in a high judicial
efﬁciency country are more likely to comply (74.1 percent), unlike the same ﬁrms in a low judicial
efﬁciency country (66.9 percent).
8In all tables of results, estimated coefﬁcients and estimated probabilities are presented. In the interpretation, we focus
only on probabilities.
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Depend. Variable: The Willingness to Comply (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Independ. Var.: Corruption Climate All Sample Political Stability Government Effectiveness Rule of Law Legal Origins
Unstable Stable Low High Low High Common Law Civil Law
Estimate Coefﬁcients
Minor Obstacle -.099 -.042 -.028 -.064 0.004 -.117 0.101 -.122 -.130 0.147
(0.077) (0.116) (0.164) (0.164) (0.162) (0.167) (0.136) (0.265) (0.193) (0.175)
Moderate Obstacle -.365 -.085 0.032 -.179 -.180 -.014 -.084 0.065 -.086 0.09
(0.101) (0.109) (0.119) (0.169) (0.138) (0.175) (0.119) (0.256) (0.217) (0.167)
Severe Obstacle -.698 -.502 -.530 -.521 -.693 -.312 -.447 -.349 -.605 -.359
(0.113) (0.128) (0.167) (0.188) (0.191) (0.145) (0.179) (0.159) (0.164) (0.215)
Very Severe Obstacle -.826 -.696 -.629 -.763 -.686 -.732 -.589 -.687 -.658 -.561
(0.121) (0.109) (0.189) (0.146) (0.193) (0.146) (0.154) (0.204) (0.178) (0.166)
Constant 1.312 2.525 1.323 3.646 5.655 -.547 1.783 -.382 -9.577 4.080
(0.12) (2.767) (5.054) (3.191) (5.190) (3.242) (4.509) (4.019) (4.481) (4.607)
Estimate Probabilities
No Obstacle 0.821*** 0.813*** 0.830*** 0.804*** 0.766*** 0.848*** 0.785*** 0.851*** 0.883*** 0.709***
(0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0152) (0.0191) (0.0244) (0.0137) (0.0179) (0.0203) (0.0120) (0.0283)
Minor Obstacle 0.806*** 0.806*** 0.826*** 0.794*** 0.767*** 0.832*** 0.801*** 0.835*** 0.869*** 0.738***
(0.00860) (0.0101) (0.0167) (0.0131) (0.0170) (0.0103) (0.0124) (0.0176) (0.0168) (0.0136)
Moderate Obstacle 0.761*** 0.800*** 0.834*** 0.774*** 0.732*** 0.846*** 0.770*** 0.859*** 0.873*** 0.727***
(0.00757) (0.00960) (0.0106) (0.0145) (0.0152) (0.0124) (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0146) (0.0160)
Severe Obstacle 0.695*** 0.724*** 0.742*** 0.709*** 0.621*** 0.803*** 0.700*** 0.801*** 0.804*** 0.630***
(0.00972) (0.0128) (0.0161) (0.0193) (0.0181) (0.0135) (0.0209) (0.00598) (0.0161) (0.0211)
Very Severe Obstacle 0.667*** 0.684*** 0.722*** 0.657*** 0.623*** 0.729*** 0.669*** 0.741*** 0.796*** 0.582***
(0.0125) (0.00896) (0.0203) (0.00829) (0.0156) (0.0112) (0.0140) (0.0112) (0.0134) (0.0105)
Control for Enterprise’s Features no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 22 619 7 989 3 273 4 716 3 339 4 448 4 236 2 882 2 689 3 335
Log-Likelihood -11 815.5 -4 140.8 -1 601.3 -2 530.2 -1 915.8 -2 091.8 -2 257.0 -1 358.1 -1 127.7 -2 039.7
] Countries 54 43 18 25 28 13 20 7 9 12
Control for industry, country and time ﬁxed effects. Observations clustered by countries. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
Firm’s Features: size, ownership, export., legal status, educ. of manager, part of the national market, memb. of a business assoc., potential of product. and ﬁrm’s experience.
1
8Then, in col. 8 and col. 7, we study the role of legal origins on law and regulation on corruption
climate effects. In the literature, it is worth noting that in common law countries, the quality of
bureaucracy and judicial efﬁciency are found to be better for improving economic activities than
French civil law. We ﬁnd that in common law countries, ﬁrms are more inclined to comply whatever
the level of corruption climate. Hence, legal origins on law and regulations may shape the inﬂuences
of the pervasiveness of corruption on ﬁrm’s willingness to comply and so on the level of demand for
good governance delivered by citizens to public ofﬁcials.
5.2 Does endemic corruption inﬂuence ﬁrm’s petty corruption?
In this part, we present results concerning the following issue: is a ﬁrm’s bribe payments to ofﬁcials
inﬂuenced by the degree of the perception of the impact of the pervasiveness of corruption on that
ﬁrm’s business? In fact, as stressed in the literature, it may be more suitable for a ﬁrm to bribe in
a context of a high impact corruption climate: corrupt activities may become a rational economic
strategy for a ﬁrm to reduce its transaction costs. In addition, these relationships could be shaped
by other features linked to the legal environment such as political stability, the degree of government
effectiveness, judicial efﬁciency, or legal origins on law and regulations.
In the ﬁrst two columns of the Table 6, we present results without these heterogeneous effects.
Controlling for ﬁrm’s attributes (col. 2), we show that a ﬁrm which considers endemic corruption
to not be an obstacle for its business has a propensity to bribe of about 9 percent whereas a ﬁrm
experiencing severe effects of the corruption climate has a propensity of about 29 percent. This result
suggests that in a more corrupt environment, ﬁrms will be more likely to bribe ofﬁcials given that the
expected cost of being corrupt would be low (the probability to be detected might be low as well as
the social sanction against corruption).
Then, our results suggest that political stability seems to inﬂuence the effects of endemic corrup-
tion on ﬁrm’s willingness to bribe. In fact, in more unstable regimes, the ﬁrm’s bribe payments are
more likely to occur whatever the level of pervasive corruption (22 percent for no obstacle in unstable
regimes against only about 2 percent for no obstacle in stable regimes). However, the inﬂuence of
the pervasiveness of corruption on the ﬁrm’s petty corruption is stronger in unstable political regime.
Indeed in more unstable regimes, a ﬁrm severely inﬂuenced by endemic corruption has a propensity
to bribe of about 56 percent while the same ﬁrm in a stable country has a propensity to bribe of about
11 percent.
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Depend. Variable: Petty Corruption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Independ. Var.: Corruption Climate All Sample Political Stability Government Effectiveness Rule of Law Legal Origins
Unstable Stable Low High Low High Common Law Civil Law
Estimate Coefﬁcients
Minor Obstacle 0.734 0.4 0.339 0.622 0.316 0.439 0.294 0.14 0.082 0.3
(0.114) (0.135) (0.144) (0.312) (0.2) (0.184) (0.155) (0.123) (0.131) (0.143)
Moderate Obstacle 1.014 0.874 0.799 1.098 1.200 0.679 0.955 0.436 0.351 1.099
(0.115) (0.223) (0.26) (0.342) (0.307) (0.217) (0.291) (0.198) (0.215) (0.257)
Severe Obstacle 1.219 1.066 0.867 1.517 1.172 1.037 0.966 0.889 0.569 1.185
(0.121) (0.181) (0.204) (0.295) (0.268) (0.221) (0.237) (0.185) (0.195) (0.192)
Very Severe Obstacle 1.383 1.436 1.458 1.550 1.637 1.291 1.603 0.923 1.233 1.473
(0.146) (0.19) (0.233) (0.305) (0.269) (0.241) (0.206) (0.161) (0.275) (0.174)
Constant -1.941 -10.443 -18.252 -1.432 -17.577 -6.065 -16.072 -1.187 -21.027 -.223
(0.049) (5.523) (7.714) (5.710) (9.084) (7.465) (8.298) (6.394) (7.348) (6.759)
Estimate Probabilities
No Obstacle 0.169*** 0.0883*** 0.229*** 0.0246*** 0.149*** 0.0609*** 0.136*** 0.0770*** 0.163*** 0.0564***
(0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0229) (0.00631) (0.0245) (0.00780) (0.0187) (0.00745) (0.0170) (0.00747)
Minor Obstacle 0.297*** 0.126*** 0.294*** 0.0448*** 0.193*** 0.0914*** 0.174*** 0.0875*** 0.175*** 0.0746***
(0.0125) (0.00988) (0.0245) (0.00655) (0.0229) (0.00776) (0.0170) (0.00811) (0.0180) (0.00910)
Moderate Obstacle 0.359*** 0.188*** 0.398*** 0.0702*** 0.367*** 0.113*** 0.290*** 0.114*** 0.217*** 0.152***
(0.0113) (0.0179) (0.0364) (0.00760) (0.0349) (0.0122) (0.0335) (0.0109) (0.0201) (0.0162)
Severe Obstacle 0.407*** 0.219*** 0.414*** 0.103*** 0.361*** 0.155*** 0.292*** 0.169*** 0.256*** 0.163***
(0.0144) (0.0164) (0.0273) (0.00782) (0.0256) (0.0206) (0.0241) (0.0176) (0.0257) (0.0197)
Very Severe Obstacle 0.447*** 0.289*** 0.561*** 0.106*** 0.473*** 0.191*** 0.438*** 0.173*** 0.401*** 0.207***
(0.0214) (0.0187) (0.0367) (0.00547) (0.0338) (0.0210) (0.0260) (0.0101) (0.0411) (0.0155)
Control for Enterprise’s Features no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 20 697 4 998 2 582 2 416 1 939 3 050 2 126 2 252 1 772 2 457
Log-Likelihood -9 738.184 -1 962.058 -1 208.557 -730.917 -871.938 -1 062.241 -992.453 -738.047 -665.427 -965.081
] Countries 66 39 23 16 23 15 16 8 8 11
Control for industry, country and time ﬁxed effects. Observations clustered by countries. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
Firm’s Features: size, ownership, export., legal status, educ. of manager, part of the national market, memb. of a business assoc., potential of product. and ﬁrm’s experience.
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0Moreover, in col. 4 and col. 5, we ﬁnd that a ﬁrm’s willingness to bribe is more important in a
country with low government effectiveness whatever the level of endemic corruption. For instance, a
ﬁrm considering corruption climate as being a very severe impediment for their business, in a country
with low government effectiveness, has a propensity to bribe of about 47 percent whereas the same
sort of ﬁrm (all things being equal) has only a propensity to bribe of about 19 percent in a country
with high government effectiveness.
Moreover, in col. 6 and col. 7, we ﬁnd that judicial efﬁciency seems to condition the effects of
endemic corruption on a ﬁrm’s practical demand for good governance. In fact, despite the severe
impact of the corruption climate on their business, ﬁrms in countries with a high index of the rule
of law has a propensity to bribe of about 17 percent, unlike the same sort of ﬁrms in low judicial
efﬁciency countries (44 percent).
Besides, in col. 8 and col. 9, we ﬁnd that in common law countries, ﬁrms are more likely to
bribe whatever the level of pervasive corruption. Contrary to the ﬁrm’s willingness to comply, some
common law features may strengthen the increasing effects of the pervasiveness of corruption on the
practical demand for good governance. These results highlight that some civil law characteristics
allow of dampening the increasing effects of endemic corruption on ﬁrms’ petty corruption whereas
common law origins reinforce this increasing effect.
5.3 Evidence in the environmental ﬁeld
We now turn to testing the inﬂuence of the pervasiveness of corruption in the environmental ﬁeld by
focusing on environmental bribe payments. While looking at the speciﬁc case of corruption related
to a ﬁrm’s environmental compliance, we try to check evidences about the environmental overcom-
pliance of manufacturing ﬁrms by estimating the effects of endemic corruption on bribe payments in
different regulations.
In Table 7, we ﬁnd that the level of a ﬁrm’s petty corruption is less inﬂuenced by pervasive cor-
ruption in the case of environmental regulations than in other regulation ﬁelds. For instance, ﬁrms
considering endemic corruption as being a very severe obstacle have a propensity of about 11 per-
cent to bribe environmental ofﬁcials whereas in the case of ﬁscal regulation the same ﬁrms have a
propensity of about 24 percent (17 percent in the case of ﬁre/building safety and sanitary regulations,
and 13 percent in the labor regulation case). These results highlight that ﬁrms are less likely to bribe
environmental regulators than other regulators, reinforcing evidence of better governance practices in
the environmental ﬁeld.
21Table 7: Endemic Corruption and Firm’s Bribe Payments in Different Regulations
Depend. Variable: Bribe Payment Environment Fiscal Labor Fire and Building Safety Sanitary
Independ. Variable: Corruption Climate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Estimate Coefﬁcients
Minor Obstacle 0.729 0.342 0.682 0.35 0.17 -.109 0.661 0.206 0.579 0.077
(0.108) (0.291) (0.104) (0.178) (0.116) (0.092) (0.126) (0.284) (0.129) (0.161)
Moderate Obstacle 1.058 1.010 0.969 0.828 0.479 0.007 0.881 0.643 0.849 0.491
(0.108) (0.197) (0.11) (0.296) (0.193) (0.209) (0.143) (0.438) (0.162) (0.343)
Major Obstacle 1.299 1.010 1.150 0.882 0.561 0.19 1.106 0.723 1.100 0.676
(0.159) (0.28) (0.146) (0.364) (0.155) (0.32) (0.155) (0.383) (0.176) (0.369)
Very Severe Obstacle 1.303 1.155 1.249 1.336 0.883 0.879 1.258 1.367 1.202 0.99
(0.172) (0.289) (0.158) (0.298) (0.159) (0.278) (0.203) (0.499) (0.199) (0.327)
Const. -1.289 -17.862 -1.893 -6.413 -1.698 -9.519 -.980 -5.605 -.734 -.859
(0.115) (7.890) (0.002) (5.584) (0.094) (4.271) (0.13) (6.197) (0.149) (5.804)
Estimate Probabilities
No Obstacle 0.113*** 0.0398*** 0.152*** 0.0785*** 0.103*** 0.0591*** 0.127*** 0.0495*** 0.117*** 0.0696***
(0.00843) (0.00643) (0.00934) (0.0165) (0.00939) (0.00991) (0.0119) (0.0148) (0.0124) (0.0146)
Minor Obstacle 0.209*** 0.0552*** 0.262*** 0.108*** 0.119*** 0.0534*** 0.219*** 0.0601*** 0.192*** 0.0747***
(0.0108) (0.00914) (0.0110) (0.00910) (0.00819) (0.00514) (0.00836) (0.00635) (0.00960) (0.0108)
Moderate Obstacle 0.269*** 0.102*** 0.322*** 0.163*** 0.156*** 0.0595*** 0.259*** 0.0901*** 0.237*** 0.109***
(0.0110) (0.0131) (0.0109) (0.0126) (0.0140) (0.00488) (0.0101) (0.0115) (0.0122) (0.0141)
Major Obstacle 0.319*** 0.102*** 0.362*** 0.171*** 0.167*** 0.0706*** 0.305*** 0.0969*** 0.286*** 0.128***
(0.0206) (0.0152) (0.0187) (0.0230) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0153) (0.0101) (0.0147) (0.0184)
Very Severe Obstacle 0.320*** 0.116*** 0.385*** 0.245*** 0.217*** 0.131*** 0.338*** 0.170*** 0.307*** 0.168***
(0.0301) (0.0203) (0.0235) (0.0205) (0.0160) (0.0127) (0.0278) (0.0282) (0.0230) (0.0171)
Control for Enterprise’s Features no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Obs. 8 172 2 442 18 469 4 536 9 114 3 502 9 900 3 390 8 835 3 264
Log-Likelihood -3 837.231 -709.08 -8 764.849 -1 816.629 -3 674.729 -1 063.779 -4 950.723 -1 172.333 -4 211.137 -1 157.882
] Countries 34 28 66 36 35 18 35 31 39 31
Control for industry, country and time ﬁxed effects. Observations clustered by countries. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
Firm’s Features: size, ownership, export., legal status, educ. of manager, part of the national market, memb. of a business assoc., potential of product. and experience of the ﬁrm.
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6 Conclusion
This paper investigated (i) whether the ﬁrms’ perception of endemic corruption could inﬂuence their
demand for good governance as well as (ii) whether the effects of endemic corruption are conditioned
on a country’s institutional features and (iii) whether there are speciﬁcities in the environmental ﬁeld.
We found, from the World Bank Enterprise Survey in developing countries, that the perception
of pervasive corruption is an important factor in a ﬁrm’s demand for good governance. Our results
also suggest that corruption climate effects are conditioned on country’s institutional features and
that a ﬁrm’s environmental petty corruption is less inﬂuenced by endemic corruption than other bribe
payments.
Two ﬁnal points are, ﬁrst, that a low level of endemic corruption is an important factor in a low
demand for good governance, suggesting that corruption or bad stakeholder behavior in terms of gov-
ernance could become an optimal second best strategy in more corrupt societies. This result implies
that as a ﬁrst step to increase the demand for good governance, a condition of sustainable develop-
ment, governance reforms policies have to consider corruption as a systemic phenomenon. Second,
the persistent effects of endemic corruption could be weakened by a better institutional framework.
In fact, we show (i) that in countries with high government effectiveness or high judicial efﬁciency
as well as in common law countries, the willingness to comply is less inﬂuenced by corruption per-
vasiveness, and (ii) that in more stable political regimes, in countries with high judicial efﬁciency or
high government effectiveness as well as in civil law countries, bribe payments are also less inﬂuenced
by endemic corruption. To deal with the problem of persistent endemic corruption, good governance
policy has to focus on the role of the institutional background and so to rethink the supply of good
governance by reconciling it with the demand side.
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A List of Countries
Table 8: List of Countries
Country Name Number of Firms Samples Country Name Number of Firms Samples
Compliance Bribe Payments Compliance Bribe Payments
Albania 179   Algeria 541 
Angola 215  Armenia 315  
Azerbaijan 319   Bangladesh 1 001  
Belarus 247   Benin 196  
Bolivia 455  Bosnia 168  
Brazil 1 641   Bulgaria 531  
Burkina Faso 50  Burundi 102 
Cambodia 186   Cameroon 110 
Cape Verde 39  China 2 629  
Colombia 731  Congo. Dem. Rep. 149 
Dominican Rep. 173   Ecuador 867  
Egypt 977  El Salvador 965  
Gambia 47  Georgia 103  
Guatemala 809   Guinea 142 
Guyana 163   Honduras 767  
India 4 073   Indonesia 713  
Jamaica 79   Jordan 387 
Kazakhstan 509   Kenya 282  
Kyrgyz Rep. 253   Lao PDR 246  
Lesotho 75   Macedonia 130  
Madagascar 293   Malawi 160  
Mali 154   Mauritania 80 
Moldova 371   Mongolia 193 
Montenegro 58  Morocco 839 .
Namibia 117  Nicaragua 836  
Niger 59  Pakistan 914 
Paraguay 470  Peru 957  
Philippines 716   Romania 521  
Russia 208   Senegal 257  
Serbia 232   Serbia/Montenegro 194  
South Africa 584   Sri Lanka 451  
Swaziland 102  Syria 549 
Tajikistan 258   Tanzania 565  
Turkey 184   Uganda 631  
Ukraine 448   Uzbekistan 299  
Vietnam 1 434   West Bank/Gaza 354 
Zambia 188 
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B Descriptive statistics
Table 9: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Firm’s Demand for Good Governance
Compliance (1 = Comply) 0.73 (0.44) 0 1 23 376
Bribe (1 = Paying Bribe) 0.41 (0.49) 0 1 23 014
Bribe for Environmental Purposes (1 = Paying Bribe) 0.29 (0.45) 0 1 9 112
Bribe for Fiscal Purposes (1 = Paying Bribe) 0.34 (0.47) 0 1 19 530
Bribe for Sanitary Purposes (1 = Paying Bribe) 0.26 (0.44) 0 1 9 927
Bribe for Labor Purposes (1 = Paying Bribe) 0.23 (0.42) 0 1 9 702
Bribe for Fire Purposes (1 = Paying Bribe) 0.31 (0.46) 0 1 10 781
The Pervasiveness of Corruption
Corruption Climate (0 = No impact, 4 = Very Severe) 1.46 (1.53) 0 4 34 405
No Obstacle (1 = Y es) 0.43 (0.5) 0 1 34 405
Minor Obstacle (1 = Y es) 0.13 (0.34) 0 1 34 405
Moderate Obstacle (1 = Y es) 0.13 (0.34) 0 1 34 405
Major Obstacle (1 = Y es) 0.14 (0.35) 0 1 34 405
Very Severe Obstacle (1 = Y es) 0.16 (0.36) 0 1 34 405
Firm’s Features
Business Association (B.A) (1 = Y es) 1.39 (0.49) 1 2 27 145
Industry dummy=1: Textile (1 = Yes) 0.27 (0.44) 0 1 37 199
Industry dummy=2: Agro-industry (1 = Yes) 0.19 (0.39) 0 1 37 199
Industry dummy=3: Wood and Paper (1 = Yes) 0.09 (0.28) 0 1 37 199
Industry dummy=4: Other (1 = Yes) 0.45 (0.5) 0 1 37 199
Ownership dummy (1 = Foreign, 2 = Domestic) 1.88 (0.33) 1 2 36 785
Exporter dummy (1 = Yes) 1.77 (0.42) 1 2 36 322
Firm Size dummy (1 = Small, 2 = Medium, 3 = Large) 1.94 (0.79) 1 3 33 076
Educ. of manager (1 = No compl. 2nd school, 6 = Post grad. degree) 4.24 (1.46) 1 6 22 453
Publicly listed company (1 = Yes) 0.08 (0.27) 0 1 25 294
Private held, limited company (1 = Yes) 0.42 (0.49) 0 1 25 294
Cooperative (1 = Yes) 0.04 (0.2) 0 1 25 294
Sole proprietorship (1 = Yes) 0.19 (0.4) 0 1 25 294
Partnership (1 = Yes) 0.12 (0.32) 0 1 25 294
Other Legal Status (1 = Yes) 0.15 (0.35) 0 1 25 294
Capacity Utilization 71.49 (22.39) 0 150 34 456
Authors’ Calculations
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Table 10: Summary statistics (2)
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Country’s Level Variables
All Sample
Political Stability (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.61 (0.58) -2.55 0.92 37 199
Government Effectiveness (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.36 (0.39) -2.01 2.22 36 673
Rule of Law (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.45 (0.39) -2.19 2 28 444
Sample: All Firms with Comply 6= No Obs.
Political Stability (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.63 (0.55) -1.59 0.86 23 376
Government Effectiveness (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.34 (0.36) -1.15 0.75 23 094
Rule of Law (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.43 (0.38) -1.24 0.23 18 703
Sample: All Firms with Bribe 6= No Obs.
Political Stability (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.57 (0.57) -2.55 0.92 23 014
Government Effectiveness (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.38 (0.38) -1.61 0.75 22 876
Rule of Law (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.48 (0.36) -1.24 0.23 15 901
Sample: All Firms with BribeEnv 6= No Obs.
Political Stability (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.53 (0.59) -1.55 0.4 9 112
Government Effectiveness (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.41 (0.37) -1.15 0.75 9 112
Rule of Law (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.63 (0.33) -1.24 0.16 5 473
Sample: All Firms with BribeTax 6= No Obs.
Political Stability (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.57 (0.58) -2.55 0.92 19 530
Government Effectiveness (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.4 (0.38) -1.61 0.75 19 398
Rule of Law (-2.5 to 2.5) -0.52 (0.35) -1.24 0.23 12 873
BribeEnv and BribeTax are the bribe payments for, respectively, environmental and ﬁscal purposes.
Authors’ Calculations
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